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DOWNSIZING AND THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN
Abstract
This study examines the process by which the Japanese permanent employment system
was increasingly deinstitutionalized and replaced by downsizing among publicly listed companies
in Japan between 1990 and 1997. We found that although economic pressure triggered
downsizing, social and institutional pressures shaped the pace and process by which downsizing
spread. The greater a firm’s legitimacy and visibility, and the more it depended on organizations
and institutions that supported the institution of permanent employm  , the more hesitant it was
to abandon that practice, even when it had much to lose financially. Specifically, large, old, and
high-reputation firms were resistant to downsizing at first, as werei ms with high levels of human
capital, as reflected by high wages. In contrast, firms with igh levels of foreign ownership were
more likely to downsize. We found that these social and institutional pressures, however,
diminished as downsizing spread across the population. We argue that this is due to a "safety in
numbers” effect. As downsizing became more prominent, the actions of any single firm were less
likely to be noticed and criticized.
This is one of the first studies to concurrently examine social and economic influences on
deinstitutionalization in a pooled data set.  It responds to the call for “longitudinal studies of
institutional activities under conditions of declining performance” (Oliver, 1992) and adds to the
empirical research on deinstitutionalization and population level organizational change.
DOWNSIZING AND THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN
INTRODUCTION
How and why do organizations abandon firmly established practices? While change has
long been a central concern of organizational theory, most research focuses on the adoption of
new practices; very few studies examine how organizational practices are eliminated. In particular
there is a paucity of literature on deinstitutionalization, the process by which deeply entrenched
practices give way to new innovations. Neoinstitutionalist theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Scott 1995) tends to concentrate on the process by which new practices become widely
disseminated and persist regardless of economic rationale.  Indeed, research on institutionalization
often "implies that institutionalization is a once-and-for-all process" (Davis, Diekmann and
Tinsley, 1994: 550). Yet processes of both institutionalization and deinstitutionalization drive
change: often, new practices cannot be adopted unless the old ones are left behind. A more
complete understanding of organizational and economic change requires us to understand how
institutionalized practices erode and make way for the new.
Theory and empirical research have begun to illuminate the process by which
organizational practices and structures are transformed through deinstitutionalization and the
closely related processes of abandoning existing practices and adopting new, illegitimate ones.
Recent research highlights the economic, technical, political, and social antecedents of
deinstitutionalization and provides evidence that institutionalization is by no means a once-and-
for-all process (Oliver, 1992). Technical and economic pressures, for example, lead organizations
to adopt practices diametrically opposed to long-held organizational values, as Kraatz and Zajac
(1996) found in their study of adoption of professional programs by U.S. liberal arts colleges. A
changing regulatory environment and shifting dynamics of power and resources can transform
even the most thoroughly entrenched notions of the corporation and its appropriate form, as
evidenced by the wholesale breakup of U.S. business conglomerates, through takeover, leveraged
buyout, and investor pressure (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1994). Social processes further
hasten deinstitutionalization, as organizations seek information from those around them on the
costs and benefits of abandoning existing practices and adopting new ones (Greve, 1995; Kraatz,
1997).
While existing research has begun to address factors that trigger deinstitutionalization,
researchers have paid less attention to the specific social and institutional forces that impede and
promote it or to how the influence of these social and institutional forces changes as
deinstitutionalization gains momentum over time.  A practice, after all, is institutionalized when it
spreads and persists due to social factors above and beyond its technical or economic efficacy
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Deinstitutionalization implies that these
social factors somehow lose their grip. But what causes these factors to fall away and by what
route does deinstitutionalization spread through an organizational field?
The fate of permanent employment during the sluggish Japanese economy of the 1990's
provides an excellent case in which to examine this question. During more than five decades of
economic growth, permanent employment became one of the cornerstones of the post-war
Japanese economic system and came to be viewed as a distinctly Japanese way of organizing
employment (Abegglen, 1958; Dore, 1973; Aoki, 1988).  Yet, recession in the 1990’s led many
executives to believe that permanent employment was incompatible with the goals of efficiency
and long-term corporate survival, and downsizing among Japanese firms rose to unprecedented
levels. Announcements of restructuring (usually a euphemism for downsizing) in the Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, Japan's leading business daily, increased from 505 in 1990 to 5324 in 1994 (Nikkei
Telecom on-line service). The unemployment rate in Japan increased to postwar highs. Layoffs,
combined with "voluntary" early retirement programs and reductions of new hires signified to
employees and to society at large that the days of guar nteed employment from graduation until
retirement were numbered.
In this paper, we examine factors that hindered and promoted downsizing and the
deinstitutionalization of permanent employment among large firms in the 1990's. This research has
two broad objectives. The first is to complement and build on existing research on
deinstitutionalization with a comprehensive examination of the process by which downsizing
became widespread and undermined the institution of permanent employment. We demonstrate
that downsizing and the deinstitutionalization of permanent employment resulted from a
combination of economic and social pressures that varied in importance across time and among
firms.  We argue that although economic factors may trigger the deinstitutionalization of a deeply
held practice, social and institutional pressures play an important role in shaping the process of
deinstitutionalization.  The greater a firm’s legitimacy and visibility, and the more it is dependent
upon supporters of an institutionalized practice for resources, the more hesitant it will be to
abandon that practice, even when it has much to lose financially. These institutional and social
constraints, however, diminish as deinstitutionalization spreads across the population, and the
chance of any single firm being singled out for censure decreases. Deinstitutionalization proceeds
as firms gain safety in numbers and no longer need to refrain from downsizing until others have
gone first. We examine the effect of firm size, age, reputation, investments in human capital and
ownership structure, on downsizing. We further examine how the influence of these factors
diminished as downsizing spread across the population.
Our second objective is to offer a rich and theoretically informed examination of how
Japanese firms responded to the recessionary 1990's. There has been plenty of speculation about
the response of Japanese firms to the economic crisis, and much hand wringing over the
apparently glacial pace of corporate change and restructuring. This paper is one of the first studies
to assess the response of Japanese firms to the economic crisis of the 1990's. However, the
implications of this paper go beyond Japan. Economic crisis in a global economy has forced
Japanese firms to confront the unpleasant prospect of dismantling the permanent employment
system. While a country insulated from the outside world might be able to protect its domestic
employment practices, those that are struggling with global competition and global markets no
longer have this luxury.  This dilemma is not unique to Japan and will increasingly be faced by
other firms and economies heavily exposed to the international marketplace. The study of how
firms address this challenge provides important insight into the processes of organizational
transformation in an increasingly global economy.
CONTEXT
In the U.S., downsizing has been studied as the adoption of a new practice (Budros,
1997). We believe that downsizing in Japan is more accurately viewed as the abandonment, or
deinstitutionalization, of permanent employment. The practice of permanent employment in Japan
refers to "the practice whereby an employee enters a company after school graduation, receives
in-company training, and remains an employee of the same company until the retirement age of
fifty-five” (Cole, 1979: 11). Large Japanese firms have had an implicit contract with their
employees to provide them with employment until age 55 (Abegglen, 1958; Dore, 1973).  The
permanent employment system was traditionally bolstered by a constant influx of lower wage and
lower skilled new graduates, so that mid-career hiring was virtually unknown. While the
retirement age in Japan is early, and permanent employment within a large company tended to end
in an employee's mid-fifties, firms continued to honor their obligation to employees in the form of
transfers to related firms.
Permanent employment developed into an institution in the first part of the twentieth
century. . At the beginning of the twentieth century, workers moved frequently between factories
and had little commitment to any company. The practice of permanent employment originated in
the early 1920's, as a means to attract and retain employees during severe labor shortages in the
aftermath of World War I and became further institutionalized in the years following World War
II, when large Japanese employers responded to severe labor unrest and militant unions by
assuring their employees of a decent living and a stable job in return for their cooperation
(Gordon, 1985; Dore, 1973). In the tumultuous early postwar years, Japanese companies and the
state legitimized the relatively new system of permanent employment by attributing to it aspects of
traditional Japanese culture such as collectivism and hierarchical and paternalistic interpersonal
relationships (Cole, 1979). Over time, permanent employment and other features of the Japanese
employment system also increasingly took on normative dimensions, as they were transformed
from merely a distinctively Japanese way of organizing employment, to a superior way to manage
employment. Economists argued that permanent employment encouraged collaboration,
development of firm-specific skills, and loyalty  (Aoki, 1988). Foreign scholars touted the
advantages of the Japanese system for western industrialized nation, and such praise from
foreigners gained wide exposure in Japan (Vogel, 1979; Dore, 1973).
By the 1980's, virtually all large Japanese firms assured permanent employment to male
employees hired directly from high school or college (called seishain, or regular employees, to
distinguish them from part-time and contract labor). Permanent employment was assured among
firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Brown et. al, 1997), and some
observers of the Japanese employment system argue that permanent employment extended more
deeply into smaller firms than often acknowledged (Cole, 1979; Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985).
The economic crisis of the 1990's. This positive evaluation of the permanent employment
system increasingly came under question as four decades of postwar economic growth ended with
the fall of the stock market and burst of the bubble economy in 1991. In the face of reduced sales,
declining levels of GDP growth, increased international competition, and a weak yen, managers
increasingly believed that Japanese firms were overstaffed. Estimates of excess employees reached
6 million (Eisenstodt, 1995).
Japanese firms historically dealt with declining performance through wage adjustments,
reduction of overtime, and dismissal of contract laborers (Mroczkowski & Hanaoka, 1997). This
is not to say that downsizing, through reduced hiring, early retirements, and dispatch of
employees to affiliated firms (shukkou), was unknown: downsizing was widespread in the 1970's
in response to the oil shocks. Downsizing during the 1970's, however, was in response to a
specific price shock and occurred in the context of industrial planning and active state guidance,
strong intercorporate groups, and respected main banks. It occurred through the shutdown of
entire industries, and transfer of employees from troubled firms to better-performing affiliates (see
Sheard, 1991; Dore 1986). Labor force reductions during this period were not seen as a retreat
from permanent employment.  In the 1980’s, the permanent employment system had lost none of
its grip and was touted as part of a highly productive, flexible, high quality and low cost Japanese
production system.
Downsizing in the 1990's, however, took on a different flavor. While firms used many of
the same techniques favored in the earlier periods--dismissal of contract and part time labor, and
dispatch of employees to affiliates-- there were distinct differences. Direct layoffs, though still a
small proportion of total dismissals, became more common (Usui and Colignon, 1996). According
to Ministry of Labor statistics, the percentage of job separations among firms with over 1000
employees due to management circumstances (as opposed to retirement and other individual
circumstances) increased from 2.3% in 1980 to 9.3% in 1998 (Ministry of Labor: 521).  The
unemployment rate increased from approximately 2.2% in 1990 to 4.2% in early 1998 (and on to
4.8% in 2000) (Ministry of Labor, 1996, 2000).
Along the path to layoffs, firms also resorted to hiring freezes. While employers may have
viewed hiring cuts as a means to protect the jobs of existing employees, hiring freezes were
nevertheless threats to the permanent employment system in several ways. The permanent
employment system was predicated upon successive cohorts of new employees entering each
year; a hiring freeze meant a gaping hole in a firm's age and promotion hierarchy. Furthermore
firms that curtailed or drastically reduced hiring risked bad publicity and poor future recruiting
prospects. Firms tend to develop very close relationships with a set of schools from which they
recruit, and hiring cuts violated an implicit agreement to a steady number of annual hires (Rohlen,
1983).  Firms had tried hiring cuts during the oil crisis, but soon backed away as they found that
hiring cuts were more costly than anticipated.
Perhaps more striking than the actual downsizing tactics were their psychological impact.
In the words of one employee commenting on an involuntary early retirement program at his firm:
"A few days ago, these managers would have been looking forward to a comfortable last few
years. Now they are told the company doesn't want them. Who will be next?" (Thomson,
1993:24). Newspapers highlighted these concerns with heart-rending series on downsized
employees and their struggle to retain their dignity and economic status. Increasing suicide rates
were attributed to economic insecurity. A spate of newspaper articles and other publications
mourned "the end of Japan" (Yamamura, 1997). Yet, despite the negative psychological impact of
labor force reductions, Japanese employers increasingly believed that downsizing was necessary
step, and the age of permanent employment was over. Elite business organizations called for a
new era of "flexibility" in employment (e.g. Keizai Doyukai, 1994). Over 70% of the Japanese
executives who responded to a 1998 poll agreed that their firms needed to revise the permanent
employment system. Ninety-five per cent said that across the Japanese economy as a whole,
permanent employment was changing either drastically (22.6%) or to some extent (LTCBR
Consulting, 1998).
Thus, in the 1990's, a belief that labor force reductions were a prerequisite for economic
renewal came face to face with the institutionalized realities of the system. Labor force reductions
in the 1990's were a direct threat to the system of permanent employment. First, more than ever
before, they involved direct layoffs, or, at least, strong pressure on employees to retire. Second,
hiring reductions eliminated an entire cohort of young employees, and threatened the structure of
age-based wage and promotion at the foundation of the permanent employment system. Third,
employees, the media, and the general public associated the downsizings of the 1990's as nails in
the coffin of the permanent employment system, and as bad omens for their own careers.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
How did Japanese firms in the 1990’s resolve this tension between the perceived benefits
of labor reductions and the deeply institutionalized nature of permanent employment? Did firms
respond purely to economic pressures, even in the face of strong social and institutional
constraints? Did these social and institutional pressures affect the course of downsizing?  What
happened to these pressures as downsizing became more prevalent over time? Our analysis
examines the process by which downsizing spread across the Japanese economy of the 1990's.
Our analytical emphasis is threefold. We begin by examining the degree to which economic
pressures triggered downsizing. Next, we examine the effect of social and institutional constraints
on downsizing. Finally, we explore the factors that caused these social and institutional constraints
to diminish and allow downsizing to spread more widely.
Economic pressures a  triggers to deinstitutionalization
Researchers of deinstitutionalization have demonstrated that economic and technical
factors can play an important role in triggering the abandonment of deeply institutionalized
practices (Oliver, 1992;  Kraatz and Zajac, 1996). Though organizations are social entities, they
respond to demands from the market. Changing consumer demands cause organizations to adopt
practices opposed to long held principles, as in the case of adoptions of professional programs by
liberal arts colleges in the U.S. (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996). Poor performance leads firms to
abandon long-maintained practices, imprinted from the earliest days of founding (Boeker, 1989).
Environmental stimuli, including the nature of product demand, technology, and competitive
environment, transform organizational strategy and structure (Chandler, 1962; Miller and Friesen,
1980; Tushman and Anderson, 1986)
We predict that economic pressures similarly triggered the deinstitutionalization of
permanent employment.  Firms that faced the most immediate and pressing signals of poor
performance were most likely to downsize. Several metrics signal to Japanese managers declining
performance and the need to reduce headcount. First, Japanese managers pay close attention to
sales growth (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985). Thus, declining sales growth is likely to indicate
economic trouble, and a need to retrench and reduce costs. However, while Japanese managers
may not display the same relentless concern for profit maximization that American managers do,
low profitability, as measured by return on assets, is also an important indicator of financial
distress, and often triggers restructuring and reorganization (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997).
Second, downsizing is more likely to be adopted when low performance is traceable to
high labor costs. Media reports of the Japanese recession of the 1990's highlighted excess labor--
due in part to over hiring during the booming years of the1980's bubble economy--as a drag on
the economy. Surveys of managers during this period indicate a wide consensus that firms were
over-staffed (Ministry of Labor, 1995).   Over-staffing and redundant employees is likely to be
reflected by a low ratio of profits to employee (Budros, 1997).
H1a: The lower the performance, as measured by return on assets and sales growth, the
more likely a firm is to downsize.
H1b: The lower its profit per employee, the more likely a firm is to downsize.
Social and institutional constraints
 While declining performance may encourage organizational change, organizations do not
abandon institutionalized practices merely because better options present themselves (DiMaggio,
1988).  The social and institutional pressures that cause a practice to be institutionalized in the
first place are likely to influence both the pace and direction of organizational change.
Organizations adopt and maintain institutionalized practices in order to enhance their legitimacy
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). By the same token, an organization that abandons an
institutionalized practice is likely to suffer a drop in legitimacy, and incur very real costs.
Downsizing in Japan in the 1990's directly threatened the legitimate system of permanent
employment. A firm that downsized and signaled to willingness to break with long-held implicit
contracts of permanent employment was perceived to be a "bad company" (in the words of a
government official that we interviewed) that had neglected its social responsibilities.1  Such anti-
social behavior threatened a firm's reputation with new employees and endangered future hiring
prospects. Several managers and government officials that we interviewed suggested that
                                         
1 Since 1990, we have interviewed numerous Japanese managers and government officials as part of our larger
research program on change in the Japanese economy. The interviews were open-ended, and covered a range of
topics concerning change and restructuring.
companies feared that downsizing would threaten sales of their product, as consumers would
hesitate to buy from a company that had neglected its social responsibility. A downsizing
announcement by a well-known company, they further argued, would also cause investors,
customers and trading partners to question a firm's fiscal health--as such deviant behavior was
seen as a desperate, last ditch measure to cut costs. A report by the Bank of Japan suggested that
Japanese firms had some experience with downsizing during the oil shocks, and had learned from
their experience first hand of the costs of downsizing: "Behind the fact that Japanese firms didn't
make large cuts in regular employees from the second oil shock and after is that companies that
carried out employment adjustments until then suffered a decline in corporate image and a
worsening in relations with their unions. Many have suggested that these tangible and intangible
costs were greater than anticipated" (Bank of Japan, 1994: 13).
This concern for legitimacy is not limited to Japanese firms, and is well documented as a
more widespread organizational phenomenon. Legitimacy enhances access to resources ranging
from financial resources and regulatory approval (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1999), customers, and
public support (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). Since organizations that have achieved high levels of
legitimacy are more likely to survive (Ruef and Scott, 1998), organizations expend considerable
energy in developing and enhancing their legitimacy. They do so through active management of
their images to communicate an aura of legitimacy (Elsbach, 1994), as well as by adopting
practices and structures that conform to prevailing norms of what an organization should look like
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Since an organization that deviates
from widely accepted practices is likely to suffer reduced legitimacy, it is likely to weigh the costs
of this decreased legitimacy against the benefits of adopting an illegitimate practice, or
abandoning a deeply institutionalized one.
The costs of deviant behavior, however, are likely to differ by firm. First, firms that have
achieved higher levels of legitimacy are likely to lose more by deviating from accepted practices.
Second, firms that are more visible are more likely to be caught, and suffer adverse publicity, for
deviating from accepted practices. These two dimensions of legitimacy and visibility are captured
by firm size, age, and reputation; and we predict that larger, older, and higher-reputation firms
will be more likely to refrain from downsizing.
Firm size: A number of researchers have linked organizational size to greater legitimacy
(Dobbin et. al, 1988; Deephouse, 1996).  While this link between legitimacy and size has received
mixed support in research in the U.S. (Deephouse, 1996; Ruef and Scott, 1998), it is difficult to
dispute that in Japan, larger firms have greater legitimacy. Large firms are at the core of the
Japanese political economy (Clark, 1979; Cole, 1979; Dore, 1973; Rohlen, 1974). They maintain
close links to large financial institutions and have superior access to funding, they have close ties
to the state, and through leadership positions in peak business organizations such as the Keidanren
and trade associations, play an important role in influencing industrial and economic policy. Such
core firms have much more to lose than firms at the periphery through deviant behavior--whether
it is neglecting accepted, institutionalized business practices or adopting new innovations
(Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King, 1991). Large firms are believed to most closely adhere to
the Japanese employment system and best embody Japanese values (note that most books on
"Japanese business practices" in both English and Japanese feature large firms as exemplars).
Because they are well known, prestigious, and believed to be good, stable employers, large firms
are able to recruit graduates of top schools. Large firms are also more likely to refrain from
deviant behavior because they are more visible.
Large firms are often under greater scrutiny by the state and general public, due to their
higher visibility. This is not unique to Japan: larger, more visible U.S. firms, for example, have
been found to be more likely to respond to government demands (Salancik, 1979). Furthermore,
the larger an organization, the more visible and well known it is, and the more likely its
downsizing will involve large numbers of people, and thus the more likely that it will attract media
coverage. At least in the early 1990's, Japanese firms were highly concerned about receiving
publicity over downsizing, since they believed that the mass media would be extremely critical. In
the mid-1990's, we interviewed a public relations manager of a large Japanese firm that had just
been taken over by a foreign firm. He complained about the constant phone calls from the press
asking when they were planning to downsize, and described his very guarded responses to them:
Any hint of downsizing, he said, would immediately be front-page news, and the coverage was
not likely to be complementary. This concern about adverse media coverage is a theme that we
detected in other interviews, and has been commented upon by other scholars (Sako, 1992).
Japanese mass media is constantly on alert for examples of misbehavior by large firms and firms
are concerned about the real impact that such negative publicity has on reputation.
H2a: The larger the firm, the less likely it s to downsize.
Firm age: Older organizations are also likely to hesitate before they downsize for similar
reasons.  Older organizations have achieved higher decrees of legitimacy, and thus are likely to
lose more by deviant behavior. As Hannan and Freeman (1984: 158) note: "Nothing legitimates
both individual organizations and forms more than longevity. Old organizations tend to develop
dense webs of exchange, to affiliate with centers of power, and to acquire an aura of inevitability."
Older firms in Japan are also more closely associated with the Japanese employment system and
with preserving Japanese values. Newer firms, such as Sony and Honda (not so new by American
standards, but still considered relative newcomers in Japan), tend to be less associated with the
existing system. To some extent, this may because newcomers were forced to rely to a greater
extent on international markets in the face of strongly entrenched domestic competition--as was
the case of Sony, Honda, and Kyocera. In fact, it is often said of Sony: "Sony is not a Japanese
company" (see for example, Shinagawa and Ushio, 2000:133).  Such firms, already seen as
deviants, or outsiders, have less to lose by defying normatively accepted practices.
H2b: The older the firm, the less likely it is to downsize.
Firm reputation. Organizations also enhance their legitimacy through endorsements
through regulatory bodies or associations (Ruef and Scott, 1998). Such endorsements signify that
an organization has conformed to normatively appropriate practices, and is thus legitimate. In
Japan, one of the most watched endorsements is the annual rankings of prestigious firms put out
by Recruit, a Japanese business publisher and job agency, based upon perceptions of recent
graduates. The annual results of the Recruit rankings are widely covered in the mass media, and
well known and remarked upon in the business community and among the general public. Firms
that have rated highly in these rankings are unlikely to compromise their reputation through
behavior such as downsizing.
H2c: Firms that rank highly in the annual Recruit rankings will be less likely to
downsize.
Wages and human capital.  Firms strive to maintain legitimacy to assure a steady stream
of necessary resources (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Thus, the degree to which an organization
conforms to legitimate, normatively accepted behaviors is likely to depend upon its patterns of
resource dependencies. A firm that is dependent upon stakeholders that strongly support an
institutionalized practice is less likely to abandon it. Co versely, a firm that is dependent on
proponents of a new order is likely to show more enthusiasm for change.
We predict that a firm’s dependence upon human capital is likely to affect its likelihood of
downsizing. The greater the extent to which a firm relies on highly trained employees with firm
specific skills to solve problems and manage complex tasks and interactions with others, the less
likely it will be to downsize. A firm will be unwilling to dismiss such employees because they are
likely to have valuable firm-specific assets. Furthermore, such employees may also have trouble
finding equivalent employment elsewhere, and may incur high severance costs (Greenhalgh,
Lawrence, and Sutton, 1988). This reluctance to downsize among firms with high levels of human
capital is likely to be particularly pronounced in Japan. Human capital in Japanese firms tends to
be highly firm-specific, to take many years to develop, and to be difficult, if not impossible to
transfer between firms (Aoki, 1988; Becker, 1964; Koike, 1988).
Firms that rely upon employees with high levels of human capital are also likely to be
reluctant to downsize out of concern for the effect on remaining employees. Downsizing has been
found to have a detrimental effect upon surviving employees and their attitudes towards their
employer (Brockner, 1990). This detrimental effect is likely to be even stronger within a Japanese
firm, in which employees believed that they had a job for life. Remaining employees are likely to
view the company as disloyal, worry whether or not they believe that they are “next,” and
decrease their own level of commitment and loyalty accordingly. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that widespread downsizing has altered employee commitment for the worse. For example,
accounts in the Japanese press suggest that a spate of corporate scandals surrounding product
liability were exposed by disgruntled employees, getting back at their companies for the disloyalty
toward employees they had demonstrated through downsizing and restructuring (e.g. Tanaka,
2000: 129). Even if employees do not resort to such strong retribution, the perception of
disloyalty is likely to cause employees to lower their contribution level. Researchers have noted
that the permanent employment system encourages strong levels of cooperation and sharing of
learning, because employees perceive their contracts to be long term (Aoki, 1988).  This level of
commitment and cooperation, it is argued, led to the impressive performance of Japanese firms,
particularly in manufacturing, up until the late 1980's.  A firm that reneges on this assurance of
permanent employment may lose employee commitment and cooperation, and thus, lose a source
of competitive advantage.
The degree to which a firm has invested in high levels of human capital is likely to be
reflected in its wage levels. A firm that pays higher than average wages is likely to have recruited
employees from top universities, and put them through rigorous, long-term, training programs.
High wage firms are likely to have more male employees, in whose training and development
firms tend to invest more. Since wages in Japanese firms are largely set according to the nenk, or
age-based system, firms whose wages exceed those of their industry are likely to have older
employees, who have developed greater levels of firm-specific human capital over their long
careers.  The costs of a decline in worker commitment are likely to be higher in firms that invest in
higher levels of human capital.  Higher levels of human capital are likely to be reflected in higher
wages. Thus,
H2d: The higher the wages a firm pays, the less likely it i  to downsize.
Foreign ownership. Research on institutionalization highlights the fact that legitimacy is
often in the eye of the beholder--and that different actors in an organizational field are likely to
have different conceptions of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). These competing notions of legitimacy
were very visible in Japanese capital markets during the 1990's. One of the most noticeable trends
in the Japanese stock market during this period was the increasing presence and increasing profile,
of foreign investors--specifically, U.S. and European financial institutions. While permanent
employment may have been legitimate and appropriate to most of the Japanese financial
institutions and corporations that held shares in publicly traded firms, it was far less so for these
foreign investors.
In the 1980's in the United States, shareholder activism led to a transformation in the
rhetoric of corporate governance. Corporations were increasingly seen as having the fundamental
purpose of the creation of shareholder value, even at the expense of other stakeholders such as
employees (Davis and Robbins, 1999). The 1980's saw a wave of downsizing in the United States.
By the 1990's, downsizing was seen as a strategic tool, and had become an established and
accepted part of normal corporate strategy (Useem, 1996). While this movement towards
"investor capitalism" originated in the United States, American institutional investors were
hastening its diffusion to other economies as well (Useem, 1998). Large foreign investors, usually
U.S. or European institutional investors and corporations, brought these notions of "shareholder
capitalism" to their investments in Japan.  In their publicly circulated reports, major American
investment banks regularly singled out Japanese companies that had announced their intention to
reduce workforce for praise.  Less constrained by conceptions of permanent employment and the
Japanese system, foreign shareholders were likely to demand immediate attention to shareholder
value, even at the expense of jobs and preserving the Japanese system.
Thus,
H2e: The greater a percentage of a firm's shares held by foreigners, the more
likely it is to downsize.
Safety in numbers and population level effects
An important focus of this paper is the question of what causes institutional and social
constraints to fall away and allow deinstitutionalization to spread across a population of
organizations. Understanding how and why institutional and social pressures eventually diminish
and allow organizations respond more directly to economic and technical pressures for change is
critical to further development of the concept of deinstitutionalization. However, little to no
research to date has documented the relative influence of social and institutional pressures over
time, and little to no research addresses the question of just what causes these pressures to
diminish.
We argue that the social and institutional constraints against abandoning an
institutionalized practice are likely to fade as firms are increasingly convinced that the social costs
of deviating from a widely accepted, legitimate practice are outweighed by the benefits. We
further submit that this occurred in the Japanese economy of the 1990's through a process of
"safety in numbers." As more firms downsized across the population, the social costs of
downsizing for any single firm decreased.  If a single firm downsizes, its deviant behavior is likely
to draw much attention and social censure. When many other firms commit the same deviant act,
however, it is less likely that any individual firm will be singled out for criticism, or, if it is
criticized, it will have plenty of company, and its own anti-social behavior is unlikely to stand out.
Furthermore, as downsizing became more widespread, a firm was more likely to get away with
the time-honored explanation of "everyone else is doing it" to justify its behavior to employees,
the general public, and other important stakeholders. Thus, increasing downsizing across the
population provided a measure of "safety in numbers" and reduced the risk that a firm is censured
for its deviant behavior.
In 1993, Pioneer learned the importance of seeking safety in numbers the hard way, when
it gave 35 senior employees a choice between retirement and dismissal (Thomson, 1993). This
announcement was featured prominently in the mass media as a harbinger of the end of permanent
employment. Several weeks later, Pioneer retracted its decision, allegedly due to concern about
unfavorable publicity, and pressure from its labor union. Several years later, however, similar
announcements of downsizing by other firms went unremarked. By the mid-1990's, mentions of
downsizings in the business press reached thousands per year--and there was less change that any
single firm would stand out and be criticized for deviant and anti-social behavior.
The concept of safety in numbers leads to the proposition that firms follow the lead of
other firms in the population: the more other firms downsized, the more likely any single firm to
downsize. We predict, however, that some firms were more likely to seek safety in numbers than
others. As we noted earlier, some firms felt the institutional and social constraints that
discouraged downsizing more acutely than others. The more legitimacy a firm had to lose, and the
more visible it was in the mass media, the more likely it was to seek safety in numbers and refrain
from downsizing until others have gone first. Thus, large, old, and high reputation firms were
more likely to downsize as downsizing became more widespread across the population. Firms
with high investments in human capital were also likely to seek safety in numbers, in this case, to
better justify their behavior to employees. Employees are more likely to accept a firm's
downsizing decision if they conclude that this decision is fair and necessary (Brockner, 1990). The
more that a firm was able to justify its downsizing by pointing out that competitors and business
associates are doing the same, the less likely it was to lose employee commitment.
We predict that firm characteristics reflecting social and institutional constraints on
downsizing will moderate the effect of population downsizing on firm downsizing.
H3: The more firms in the population that downsize, the less likely social and
institutional pressures (as reflected by size, age, reputation, and wage) are to
constrain downsizing.
DATA AND METHODS
The data set consists of all companies listed either on the first or second section of the
Tokyo stock exchange or on one of Japan's regional stock exchanges in 18 selected industries (see
appendix) between 1990 and 1997, a total of 1638 firms.  We included in our sample only firms
that were publicly listed in all years from 1990 to 1997. This omits 32 firms that were listed in
1990 but exited from the sample during that period. Exits were almo t all due to merger or
acquisition or delisting rather than bankruptcy. Since only a very small percentage of the firms of
the sample exited during this period, selection bias is unlikely to be a problem.
Variables
Dependent variable.  The dependent variable measures a downsizing event. We define
downsizing as a decrease in number of employees of 5% or more between year t-1 and year t.
Research on downsizing has measured downsizing in a variety of ways. For example, researchers
on downsizing in the United States have gathered reports of downsizing events from the mass
media (Budros, 1997). Although this technique has also been used to study downsizing in Japan
(Lee, 1997), public announcements of downsizing in Japan do not necessarily capture actual
downsizing. Close scrutiny of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Japan’s leading economic newspaper,
reveals announcements of proposed large labor force reductions rather than details of actual
downsizings that have occurred. We believe that actual downsizing is best reflected in real
reductions in labor force rather than announcements.
We define downsizing as a dichotomous variable, primarily to capture the firm’s decision
to downsize or not.  There are several additional advantages to defining downsizing as a
dichotomous variable. First, relatively large changes in employment are most likely to violate
social norms around permanent employment. Changes of -5% or more are more likely to be
publicized. Changes of this magnitude are also more likely to occur through concentrated efforts
to reduce workforce, rather than through attrition. A dichotomous measure of downsizing is also
easier to interpret than a continuous measure that c ptures both increase and decrease in
employment.  In order to check for robustness of this measure of downsizing, we conducted
similar analyses measuring downsizing at changes of –10% and -2% or more.
Freeman and Cameron (1993: 12) define downsizing in the United States as “…a set of
activities, undertaken on the part of the management of an organization, designed to improve
organizational efficiency, productivity, and/or competitiveness. It represents strategy implemented
by managers that affects the size of the firm’s work and the work processes used.” Consistent
with this definition, downsizing in the 1990’s in Japan was  result of conscious managerial
decisions to reduce employment, and was accomplished through reductions in hiring, early
retirements, sending employees to affiliates, and, in some cases, layoffs. We do not distinguish
between these different means of downsizing: as we discussed earlier, all four represent breakage
of the norms around permanent employment.
Independent variables.  Return on assets is profits before taxes and extraordinary items
divided by total assets. Sales growth is the percentage growth in sales between year t-1 and year t.
Losses over previous 5 yearsare the sum of years in the previous 5 years that a firm experiences
losses.  Profits per employee is the deviation from industry mean of the ratio of a firm's operation
profits to total employees. All performance measures, except for sales growth, which measures
change over the previous year, are lagged by one year.
 Firm size is the log of total assets. Firm age is the number of years between a firm's
founding and 1990. Recruit endorsement is the sum of the number of times that a firm appeared in
Recruit's annual listing of the most attractive 50 firms for new graduates during the 1980's. We
use data from the 1980's for several reasons. First, frequent appearance in past rankings indicates
that a firm had established a substantial reputation as an employer. Second, since it is likely that
downsizing behavior influenced Recruit rankings, we believe that rankings from the 1980's are a
better measure of reputation, pre-downsizing.
Wage is the deviation from industry mean of a firm's payroll expense divided by the total
number of employees.  Foreign ownership is the percentage of shares held by non-Japanese
shareholders. The Nikkei NEEDS data set does not distinguish between the nationalities of
foreign owners. However, hard copy volumes of corporate reports, found in Nikkei Kaisha
Nenkan, report the top 10 shareholders for publicly listed firms. We examined the identities of
these shareholders for a subset of about 700 firms, and found that foreign shareholders are almost
exclusively large American, European, or Australian corporations or institutional investors.
Population downsizing is the sum of downsizings of all firms in the population, minus the
focal firm, over the three previous years.  We divided this by the to al number of firms in the
population, minus the focal firm, multiplied by three (this m asures the total number of potential
downsizing events within the population during this period). Thus, this measure can be thought of
as the percentage of firm years in which a downsizing occurred, over the previous three years.
We experimented with different length periods over which to measure population
downsizing. Various measures, including cumulative downsizing from 1990, downsizing over the
past 4 years, downsizing over the past 2 years, and downsizing in the previous 1 year rendered
similar patterns of results. While research on adoptions of new practices often examines the
cumulative number of adopters, or percentage of adoptions, this is less appropriate in this case.
We argued that population level downsizing is likely to be influential due to a safety in numbers
effect--when large numbers of downsizings in the recent past will make any given firm's
downsizing less visible. Thus, a measure relatively recent downsizings, rather than cumulative
downsizings, is likely to be more appropriate.
Control variables.  Real GDP growth between t-1 and t measures macroeconomic
conditions. A continuous measures of calendar year controls for the passage of time.  We control
for exposure to foreign markets with a measure of exports divided by sales for the previous year.
Finally, we include a set of dummy variables for each industry to control for inter-industry
differences in propensity to downsize.
Analytical approach
Our data consists of a panel of 1638 firms observed over 8 years. Downsizing is an event
that may or may not occur in any given year, and may occur in multiple years. We employed a
variation of discrete time event history methodology (Allison, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991). We used
a panel probit model to estimate the hazard of a downsizing event in a given year in a pooled
sample of each organization observed during each of the 8 years.
P(t)= F(a + b1x1 + b2x2(t) + e)
P(t) is the probability of a downsizing event occurring at time t.   1 is a set of time
invariant covariates while x2 is a set of time-varying covariates. The discrete time model is
appropriate when information on the exact timing of an event is not available, and multiple
organizations report the same event as occurring at the same time (i.e. in the same year).2
FINDINGS
Table 1 shows the number of downsizings per year across the sample. In 1990, 5.9% of
the firms in the sample reduced employment by 5% or more, while in 1997, 24% downsized by
5% or more. Figure 1 illustrates the rising number of firms that downsized at least once between
1990 and 1997. In 1991, 10% of the firms in the sample reduced their employment by 5% or
more. By 1997, over 50% of the firms had downsized at least once. Larger downsizings, of 10%
or more, though more rare, also gained momentum over time. By 1997, over 20% of all firms had
downsized by 10% or more.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and Table 3 presents bivariate correlations.
Table 4 reports results of random effects panel probit analyses of downsizings of 5% or more.
Model 1 includes measures of economic pressures and controls. Consistent with hypothesis H1a,
firms downsized in response to low return on assets and low sales growth. Mounting years of
poor performance further increased the likelihood of downsizing. Contrary to hypothesis H1b,
low profits per employee did not increase a firm's likelihood of downsizing. In additional analyses,
we examined an alternative measure of excess employment, sales per employee. However, we
found no significant relationship between sales per employee and downsizing.
Model 2 adds size, age, Recruit endorsement, wages, and percentage foreign ownership.
Although Model 2 suggests that larger firms were not significantly less likely to downsize, the
                                         
2 In most cases, discrete and continuous time models produce similar results (Allison, 1984).  We use STATA's
xtprobit routine, which uses a generalized estimating equation approach to estimate random effects probit models
STATA, 1997 (Liang and Zeger 1986; STATA, 1997). We employ random effects models to address unobserved
heterogeneity due to repeated observations on the same firm across years, and among firms in any given year. It is
particularly important to control for unobserved heterogeneity between firms since downsizing is a repeated event.
Some firms downsize more than others, and if these different propensities to downsize are due to unmeasured firm-
specific factors, statistical tests of resulting coefficient estimates may be inaccurate.
We further addressed this potential problem of unobserved heterogeneity among firms in several ways.
First, following the recommendation of Allison (1984), we include a variable that measures each firm’s cumulative
history of downsizing since 1985. Second, we report standard errors derived from the Huber/White/sandwich
robust estimator of variance. This estimator allows us to obtain consistent standard errors even when the
correlation structure assumed by a probit model is violated. Using this estimator allows us to relax the assumption
that observations within the same cluster (in our case, the same firm observed across the 8 years) are uncorrelated
(White 1980; STATA, 1997).
main effect of size on downsizing became significant with the addition of an interaction between
size and population downsizing as shown in Model 4. Thus, we conclude that, consistent with
hypothesis H2a, size constrained downsizing.  Accordingly, when population downsizing was
rare, large firms were hesitant to downsize. As downsizing became more prevalent, the effect of
size diminished. (In supplemental analyses, we substituted the log of number of employees in the
previous year for assets, and found a similar negative and significant relationship between size and
downsizing.) In supplementary analyses we also experimented with including a squared term for
assets, which would suggest that firm size had a curvilinear relationship to change, but found that
logged assets offered the best fit.
Older firms were less likely to downsize, consistent with hypothesis H2b. As predicted by
hypothesis H2c, Recruit endorsement decreased the probability of a firm's downsizing (although
as in the case of firm size, significance levels increased in models containing and interaction
between Recruit endorsement and population downsizing). Consistent with hypothesis H2d, high
wage firms were less likely to downsize. The greater the percentage of a firm's shares held by
foreigners, the more likely it was to downsize, consistent with hypothesis H2e.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the effect of social and institutional constraints on downsizing
diminished as downsizing increases across the population. To test this hypothesis, we added to
our model population downsizing, and interaction terms between population downsizing and each
of the institutional and social constraints examined above. Model 3 includes population
downsizing, and shows that the main effect of population downsizing, absent the interaction
terms, was positive.
Model 4 adds an interaction term between assets and population downsizing.  Consistent
with hypothesis H3, the more downsizing in the population, the less a firm's size hindered a firm's
propensity to downsize. Put another way, the larger the firm, the more likely it was to wait till
others have downsized before it went itself. Figure 2 illustrates this interaction effect at three size
levels: the mean, and two standard deviations above and below the mean. The curve depicting the
relationship between population downsizing (the x axis) and the probability of a firm downsizing
(y axis) is much steeper for larger firms than for small firms.
  Model 4 also includes an interaction term between years of negative ROA and assets.
This is in order to rule out an alternative explanation for the diminishing effect of firm size over
time: that large firms had deeper pockets, and could withstand more years of poor performance
before they are forced to take action. This interaction is positive and significant, indicating that
the larger the firm, the more years of poor performance it suffers before downsizing. However,
even when this interaction is included, the interaction between size and population downsizing
remains strong and significant.
 Model 5 examines the interaction between age and population downsizing, similarly
controlling for the interaction between age and years of poor performance. The older the firm, the
more likely it was to wait until others in the population have gone first before downsizing itself.
Figure 3 demonstrates this interaction effect, at mean age, and 2 standard deviations above and
below the mean. Again, the curve for older firms is steeper than for younger firms, indicating a
closer relationship between population downsizing and firm downsizing for older firms. Model 6
demonstrates that firms with Recruit endorsements were similarly more likely to follow
population downsizing, as are high wage firms, as shown in Model 7. Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate
these interaction effects, again, at mean levels and two standard deviations above and below.
Model 8 includes an interaction between population downsizing and foreign ownership. The
coefficient estimate for this interaction is positive and significant, suggesting that firms with
foreign ownership become more likely to downsize, as downsizing increases across the
population.
Model 9 includes all of the interactions between population downsizing and social and
institutional constraints, as well as the interaction between years of poor performance and assets.
While the size and significance of these interaction effects drop somewhat when all are included in
the same model, they remain consistent in direction with their effects when entered in the model
separately.
Control variables. Several control variables rendered significant results. Year had a
positive effect on downsizing, even controlling for population downsizing, indicating that
propensity to downsize increased with the passage of time. The estimate of GDP growth is also
positive and significant. The positive relationship between growth and downsizing probably
reflects the fact that the Japanese economy began to grow again after 1994, just as downsizing
began to spread widely.
 Firms with a large percentage of exports were less likely to downsize. One explanation is
that exporters faced considerable cost pressure in 1985 after the yen jumped in value as a result of
the Plaza Accord. Accordingly, they made adjustments in their labor forces before the 1990's
recession, and were less likely to have over-hired during the bubble years of the late 1980's. In
contrast, domestic firms, long insulated from foreign competition, were most badly hit by the
1990's recession.
Strong and significant effects for industry dummies indicate that the propensity to
downsize differed across industries.  This may reflect either differing economic conditions across
industries (separate from firm specific or macro-economic circumstances). It may also reflect
intra-industry contagion. Further research on the source of inter-industry differences in
downsizing is necessary.
Finally, the more a firm downsized in the past, the more likely it was to downsize again.
Researchers have found that change builds momentum within organizations, as they persist in
familiar and well-rehearsed routines  (Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett, 1993). Downsizing is also
likely to build momentum within a firm, once it has executed its first downsizing. Once resistance
to downsizing is overcome, it opens an opportunity for continuous or radical transformation
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Greenwood and Hinings, 1988). The effect of past downsizing on
a firm’s propensity to downsize may also mean that firms downsized in increments. If this were
the case, and the effect of past downsizing was due to firms spreading downsizing over multiple
years, we should observe differences across the dependent variable: past downsizing should have
a greater effect on 2% downsizing, the smallest increment, than on 5% or 10% downsizing. This,
however, is not the case, supporting our argument in favor of momentum.
Additional analyses with alternative specifications of downsizing. Tables 5 and 6 test
alternative specifications of downsizing to examine the robustness of our models. Table 5 presents
analyses of downsizings of 10% or more. Consistent with the previous analyses, performance and
foreign ownership trigger downsizing, while firm age, Recruit endorsement, and wage levels all
inhibit it. Although firm size at first appears to have a positive effect on downsizing, Model 3
indicates that the coefficient estimate becomes negative when the interaction between population
downsizing and years of poor performance is included.  This suggests that large firms used thei
greater resources to avoid having to carry out large downsizings, but downsized as losses
mounted.
There is less evidence in the case of 10% or greater downsizing that population
downsizing reduced institutional and social constraints on downsizing. While the signs of the
coefficient estimates are in the predicted direction, they lose significance, with the exception of
reputation. We interpret this to reflect the relative scarcity of downsizings of this magnitude. Even
when other firms were downsizing, a labor force reduction of 10% or more was likely to stand
out.  We predict that that as downsizings become even more prevalent, and large downsizings
become more common, the interactions between population downsizing and institutional and
social constraints will become larger and more significant.
Table 6 operationalizes downsizing as changes in employment of -2% or more. We find
very similar results to the -5% case, suggesting further that our findings are robust to different
specifications of the model and the dependent variable.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The economic crisis experienced by Japan in the 1990's offers researchers a valuable
opportunity to examine change in highly institutionalized management practices. This paper
examined the fate of one of these practices, permanent employment, in an analysis of the spread of
downsizing among publicly listed Japanese firms.  Our objective was to provide a comprehensive
examination of how firms resolved the tension between economic pressures to abandon a highly
institutionalized practice and social pressures to retain it. We found that poor performance
encouraged downsizing, while concerns for maintaining legitimacy hindered it, particularly among
more legitimate and more visible firms. We further found that resource dependencies on
employees with high levels of human capital decreased a firm's likelihood of downsizing, while
dependence on foreign capital increased it. Social and institutional concerns, however, gave way
to economic pressures as downsizing became increasingly widespread across the population and
firms found safety in numbers.
Economic pressures trigger downsizing. Consistent with existing research, we found
that economic pressures triggered deinstitutionalization. The lower a firm’s profits and sales
growth, the more likely it was to downsize. This result supports Kraatz and Zajac's (1996)
admonishment to organizational researchers to seek economic and technical as well as social
explanations of organizational change. We must acknowledge here that we are agnostic on the
question of whether or not downsizing actually improved performance. Studies of U.S. firms
demonstrate that downsizing is not the panacea that it is often made out to be and the effect of
downsizing on long term is questionable at best (Cascio, 1993; Budros, 1997). The findings in this
paper, however, do not hinge upon the question of whether downsizing was truly effective or not
for Japanese firms. The important point is that Japanese managers believed that downsizing was a
necessary and effective means to respond to economic pressures.
Social and institutional constraints hinder deinstitutionalization. This paper extends
existing research on deinstitutionalization by paying particular attention to the social and
institutional pressures that hindered downsizing, and the factors that caused these pressures to
diminish. We found evidence of these pressures at work: size, age, reputation, and wage levels all
decreased propensity to downsize. Foreign ownership, in contrast, promoted downsizing.
There are alternative explanations for the finding that large and old firms were less likely
to downsize. A vast literature illustrates large firms' resistance to change (Haveman, 1993).
Because they are highly bureaucratized and settled into familiar and successful routines, large
firms possess higher levels of inertia. For these firms, change is difficult to negotiate--and even
threatening to well-being and survival (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Large firms also have deeper
pockets and can withstand declining performance for a longer period before seeking change.
Older firms tend to resist change for similar reasons: they have settled into comfortable routines
and stable relationships with the external stakeholders. Our results, however, indicate that the
relationship between size and age and downsizing is due to more than inertia. Size and age
depressed downsizing rates even when we added interactions between size and age and years of
negative performances, capturing the degree to which a firm tended to wait for overwhelming bad
news before downsizing. Furthermore, inertia alone does not explain why size and age became
less likely to hinder downsizing as population downsizing increased.
Our finding that large firms in Japan initially resisted downsizing highlights the different
institutional environments in which Japanese and U.S. firms are embedded.  In his research into
downsizing in the U.S., Budros (1997) found that the larger the firm, the more likely it was to
downsize. Budros argued that large firms were more visible, and thus are more likely to attract
unwanted scrutiny by shareholders if they did not downsize. The greater visibility of large firms in
Japan led to just the opposite outcome: large firms avoided downsizing to avoid unwanted
scrutiny for adopting an illegitimate practice. While U.S. firms faced a very clear incentive to
downsize--shareholders rewarded downsizing with a boost in share price-- in Japan, even large
institutional shareholders were ambivalent about downsizing and its social impact.
Foreign investors, on the other hand, were less ambivalent than Japanese investors about
downsizing. The positive relationship between foreign share ownership and downsizing suggests
an important role of global capital markets in spreading new conceptions of management. This
finding is also consistent with research that suggests that organizational change comes from
players from the outside or at the periphery who hold different notions of how business is done
and are less concerned with preserving the status quo (Leblebici et al. 1991; Fligstein, 1996).  It is
interesting to note that although firms with high levels of foreign ownership were more likely than
domestic-owned firms to downsize, our finding that population downsizing increased the effect of
foreign ownership on downsizing suggests that foreign-owned firms also sought safety in
numbers. This suggests that even firms with high levels of foreign ownership wanted to reduce
adverse publicity from downsizing by waiting for others to go first.
More research is merited into how foreign shareholders exerted their influence. One
possibility is that the relationship between foreign ownership and increased downsizing occurred
only within foreign-controlled firms--in firms with one foreign institution holding 33.4% or more
(a de facto controlling stake according to the Japanese commercial code). Another is that
foreigners exerted influence even without a controlling stake. Because our data summarizes only
the total amount of foreign ownership and not whether a single foreign shareholder has a
controlling stake, we cannot distinguish between a foreign-owned firm, such as Mazda, and a firm
with a large proportion of foreign ownership, though no single owner, such as Sony. However,
since foreigners had controlling stakes in only a few publicly listed Japanese companies during this
period, it is likely that foreigners exerted their influence through other means than direct control.
Our findings that size, age, reputation, and investments in human capital constrained
downsizing, while foreign ownership promoted it, offer insight into the social and institutional
pressures that maintain an institutionalized practice. Neoinstitutional theory has been criticized for
over-emphasizing the cognitive aspects of institutionalization and neglecting issues of power,
politics, and resource dependencies (Hirsch, 1997), and the normative and coercive pressures that
keep an institutionalized practice in place (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). Our findings similarly
suggest that institutionalization is not simply a state of mind: permanent employment persisted not
only because it was taken-for-granted, but also because it was consistent with the interests of
important stakeholders. The pace and process of downsizing reflected firms' attempts to manage
legitimacy and preserve their reputation and corporate image in the face of opposition of
important stakeholders. Studies of deinstitutionalization must take into account the fact that
deeply institutionalized practices are often not only taken for granted on a cognitive level, but are
actively maintained and supported by important stakeholders who find those practices consistent
with their own interests.
Safety in numbers. An important emphasis of this research was to discover how and why
the social and institutional constraints that hindered downsizing fell away and allowed downsizing
to spread more rapidly across the population. We found that population downsizing moderated
the effect of social and institutional constraints on downsizing. The more downsizing in the
population over the previous three years, the less likely it was that size, age, reputation, and high
investments in human capital hindered downsizing. We argue that this reflects a "safety in
numbers” effect, as firms waited until others go first to avoid criticism for deviant behavior. The
more other firms downsized, the less likely any firm would be singled out for criticism, the less
visible its downsizing would be, and the better it could argue that  "everyone else is doing it" to
legitimate its behavior to important constituencies.
An alternative explanation of our finding that population downsizing increases a firm's
propensity to downsize is that increasing adoption rates reflect downsizing's increased legitimacy.
Organization theorists have argued that firms interpret increasingly widespread adoption of a new
practice as a sign of its legitimacy, and adopt the practice themselves to conform to accepted
standards of behavior (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). There is, however, reason to believe that
legitimacy is not the main impetus for population-level imitation in downsizing. While firms seek
to appear legitimate to appeal to sources of capital, regulators, or the general public, in 1990's
Japan, however, it is not clear that downsizing was considered legitimate by any of these
constituencies, save foreign investors, a relatively minor stakeholder. As we noted previously,
downsizing and the potential demise of the permanent employment system was of great concern
to the general public and to the state, which saw it as a threat to social stability. In the face of this
resistance to downsizing among important constituencies, it is difficult to argue that firms would
imitate each other to enhance their own legitimacy.
We further tested the possibility that the increasing legitimacy of downsizing explains the
effect of population level downsizing, by examining the relationship of downsizing to performance
over time. Neo-institutional theorists argue that as practices become institutionalized, they
become increasingly decoupled with economic and technical necessity, and organizations adopt
them in order to appear legitimate rather than to solve specific business problems (Tolbert and
Zucker, 1983). Downsizing among U.S. firms appears to have been driven by legitimacy
concerns, as firms increasingly appeared to downsize to please shareholders and appear up to date
with popular business practices, regardless of necessity (Budros, 1997).  As a result, the business
press began to condemn firms for "corporate anorexia" due to over-aggressive downsizing
programs (New York Time, June 18, 1996:C1, as cited in Budros, 1997).  If Japanese firms
followed the downsizing behavior of others in the population in search of legitimacy, we should
observe that as downsizing increased across the population, it became less related to performance.
Supplementary analyses, available from the authors, find no evidence of this. From the early
1990's to 1997, downsizing remained closely coupled with poor profits and sales growth. Thus,
we conclude that safety in numbers, rather than increased legitimacy of downsizing, is the more
likely explanation for population level effects.
 The safety in numbers effect implies that large, old, high reputation, and high wage firms
only downsize once their smaller, newer, more peripheral counterparts have. Large firms
downsize not through a desire to increase their legitimacy, but rather, to avoid adverse publicity
and damage to their image as good corporate citizens, and justify their actions to important
stakeholders. The safety in numbers effect stands in contrast with studies that demonstrate that
organizations imitate larger, higher status firms (e.g. Haveman, 1993; Podolny, 1994). This
contrast may reflect the fact that processes of interorganizational contagion depend upon a
practice's legitimacy.  While organizations imitate larger, higher status firms when a practice's
legitimacy and efficacy are uncertain, a practice that is considered illegitimate and deviant is likely
to spread by other paths (Rogers, 1995). Davis and Greve (1997), for example, attributed
strikingly different diffusion patterns between the poison pill and the golden parachute among
American firms to different levels of legitimacy. However, while these authors suggest that
illegitimate practices are less likely to diffuse through social processes and spread based upon
immediate necessity, or for firm-specific, idiosyncratic factors, our research suggests that even
illegitimate practices spread through social processes. Practices deemed illegitimate by important
stakeholders are likely to spread via a safety in numbers effect, as firms wait for others to go first
and to allow negative publicity to subside, before they act themselves.
Our research into the process by which downsizing spread and gained momentum suggests
both parallels and points of divergence between deinstitutionalization and institutionalization.
Similar to institutionalization, deinstitutionalization unfolds over time, and reflects the interplay of
social and economic pressures. In the course of institutionalization, however, technical and social
pressures increasingly become decoupled as organizations adopt practices for social reasons,
rather than technical or economic exigencies (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell,
1983), while deinstitutionalization moves in reverse. As a practice erodes throughout a
population, institutional and social constraints fall away, and  corporate behavior becomes more
closely coupled to economic pressures. Yet d institutionalization is not simply
institutionalization's converse. Our research suggests that while institutionalization progresses as
organizations strive for legitimacy, deinstitutionalization progresses as organizations try to
balance the perceived benefits of casting aside an institutionalized practice with the social costs of
illegitimate behavior. Safety in numbers may not be the only way that organizations seek to
balance these costs. Our findings, however, suggest that far more research is warranted into
deinstitutionalization--as a process that is both similar to, and distinct from, institutionalization.
Our research leaves a puzzle for further research. In one of the only other studies that
trace the progress of deinstitutionalization over time, Kraatz and Zajac (1996) found little
evidence that social and institutional constraints slowed the pace of deinstitutionalization, and
little evidence of population-level influence. Several factors may explain the differences between
our studies. While the liberal arts colleges studied by Kraatz and Zajac could adopt professional
programs while maintaining their technical core of liberal arts education, downsizing in Japan
presented a direct threat to the existing system of permanent employment. The nature of the
organizational fields examined in these two studies may also explain the lack of population
influence in Kraatz and Zajac’s research: liberal arts colleges may look less to the population than
to their own peer group of selected schools, as Kraatz’s (1997) later research suggested. At the
very least, the unexplained differences between these two studies attest to the need for more
research on deinstitutionalization across a greater range of phenomena and in a greater range of
settings.
Alternative explanations. The safety in numbers effect hinges around our finding that
population downsizing increased a firm's propensity to downsize, and decreased the effect of
social and institutional pressures on downsizing. Since a population level measure of downsizing
is important to our analysis, it is important to establish that it is a real effect and does not simply
capture omitted variables that similarly vary with time. While it is impossible to rule out beyond
any doubt the possibility of omitted variables, we can eliminate some obvious alternatives.
One possibility is that downsizing rates increased with deepening pessimism about the
economy. We controlled for the possibility that worsening macroeconomic conditions were
responsible for increased downsizing by including GDP growth in our models. Contrary to
expectation, GDP growth had a positive effect on downsizing. With improving economic growth
after 1994, optimism about the state of the Japanese economy increased. Surveys of business
sentiment conducted by the Japan's Economic Planning Agency indicated that 1994 was the low
point in sentiment for prospects for growth. Optimism about the prospects for the Japanese
economy actually increased between 1994 and 1995, again experiencing a distinct drop in 1998
and an even sharper one in 1999 (EPA, 1998). Thus, there is no evidence that pessimism about
the future of the Japanese economy led to increasing downsizing, at least until 1997.
Increasing downsizing over time may also be due to factors external to Japan--for
example, a worldwide downsizing boom. However, during this period, downsizing among
developed economies was largely limited to the U.S., due to very strict constraints on layoffs in
Europe. We controlled for two obvious points of international influence: foreign ownership and
exports. We also examined headlines of articles on downsizing and restructuring in the Japanese
business press during this period (through the Nikkei telecom news service) to determine whether
reports of U.S. downsizing in the business press also influenced Japanese firms. We found,
however, that while downsizing among American companies attracted attention in the late 1980's,
by the 1990's, these reports were overwhelmed by reports of downsizing within Japanese firms.
Thus, it is unlikely that increasing reports of downsizing activity in the U.S. stimulated rising
downsizing in Japan.
As we noted earlier, we also added a variable (year) that measured the passage of time.
The coefficient estimate of year was positive and significant, even when population downsizing
was included. This suggests that there was an increasing propensity towards downsizing over
time. However, the positive and significant estimate of population downsizing suggests that even
in the presence of a temporal trend towards more downsizing, population downsizing had a
separate effect.
Downsizing and the Japanese economy. This paper had dual objectives: 1) to illuminate
processes of deinstitutionalization, and 2) to better understand change in the Japanese economy
during the 1990's. Based upon this research, we draw several conclusions about the response of
Japanese firms to the 1990's recession. First, Japanese firms did downsize in response to poor
performance. While foreign investors and journalists have criticized Japanese firms for not
responding quickly enough to economic pressure for change, our analyses suggest that Japanese
firms responded to declining profits by reducing their permanent labor forces, and that these cuts
increased throughout the 1990's. These cuts may not have been as large as believed necessary by
some observers; nevertheless, downsizing gradually increased momentum over time.
Second, we predict that even when economic conditions improve, and even when an aging
population reverses the problem of excess labor to one of labor shortage, Japanese firms will not
revert back to the permanent employment system as it existed in the 1980’s. While Japanese firms
may never develop a taste for American style mass layoffs, and while many employees may
continue to enjoy long-term careers with the same firm, we believe that downsizing in the 1990's
effectively deinstitutionalized permanent employment. As we noted earlier, downsizings affected
the loyalty of remaining employees, and it is difficult to see how firms can enjoy the same level of
employee commitment that they enjoyed under the permanent employment system. Downsizings
have also affected the loyalty of new hires: a young generation of employees, raised on a diet of
news reports of firms econsidering the permanent employment system, may think twice before
committing to a lifetime at a company. Even if firms are able to win back employee loyalty,
curtailment of new hires in many firms has eliminated a whole cohort of new employees, and
when this hole in the career ladder hits middle management levels, firms may be forced to resort
to mid-career hiring.
As downsizings have become more widespread across the population, firms are able to
downsize more easily, with less fear of criticism, and managers are more likely to consider
downsizing as a bona fide managerial practice. Particularly telling is our finding that downsizing
appears to gain momentum within firms. Once a firm has downsized once, the resistance to
downsizing appears to fade. While we see no evidence that downsizing in Japan as of 1997 had
become a legitimate business practice that firms adopted regardless of performance, the fading of
the social and institutional constraints to downsizing over size are evidence that firms hesitate less
before taking this action. In fact, many companies have taken to telling their new recruits, in the
traditional April welcoming ceremony that they should no longer expect a job for life.
We believe that our findings also offer insight into the apparently slow pace of other ty es
of change among Japanese firms in the 1990's. In the case of downsizing, change was slow at first,
and rare among the larger, older, high reputation, and high wage firms. However, change gained
momentum over time, as firms looked to each other for safety in numbers. We predict that other
aspects of change among Japanese firms--from promotion of women managers, to adoption of
new wage and bonus systems, to a winding down of cross-shareholdings, are likely to follow a
similar pattern.
CONCLUSION
Organization theory has historically had little to say about how organizations abandon
highly legitimate, institutionalized practices. This research on the deinstitutionalization of
permanent employment in Japan provides just the type of longitudinal study called for by Oliver
(1992): "Longitudinal studies of institutionalized organizational activities under conditions of
declining performance would provide particularly appropriate contexts within which to examine
the destabilization of institutionalized practices." This paper traced the process by which
downsizing spread among large Japanese firms in the 1990's. We argued that although economic
factors play a role in triggering deinstitutionalization, social and institutional factors shape its pace
and direction. These social and institutional constraints, however, give way, as downsizing
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Table 1: Percent of firms downsizing per year, 1683 listed firms, 1990-1997
Size of
downsizing
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
2% or more .175 .126 .142  .191  .311  .438 .513 .518
5% or more .059 .038 .049 .106 .159 .205 .240 .222
10% or
more
.027 .016 .015 .042 .074 .085 .071 .075
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, 1638 firms, 1990-1997
Variable name Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
2% or greater employment
decrease
.302 .459 0 1
5% or greater employment
decrease
.138 .342 0 1
10% or greater employment
decrease
.047 .213 0 1
Roa(t-1) .038 .043 -.472 .250
Change in sales .030 .116 -.675 2.114
Years negative ROA in
previous 5 years
2.379 1.089 0 5
Profits/employee (t-1)
standardized to industry
0 1 -10.957 10.984
Total assets (ln) 1.940 1.364 6.836 16.008
Firm age 48.619 14.780 9 109
Top 50 Recruit ranking .104 .896 0 10
Wages  (t-1) standardized to
industry wage
0 1 -5.244 4.468
Foreign ownership (t-1) .041 .068 0 .777
Downsizing in population
(previous 3 years)
.106 .042 .057 .194
Real GDP growth 2.112 2.007 -.4 5.5
Exports/sales (t-1) .085 .142 0 .996
Sum of downsizings for firm x,
1985-t-1
.996 1.404 0 11
Table 3: Bivariate correlations, 1638 firms, 1990-1997
Variable name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 5% or greater employment
decrease
1
2 10% or greater employment
decrease
.56 1
3 Roa(t-1) -.30 -.26 1
4 Change in sales -.15 -.12 .11 1
5 Years negative ROA in
previous 5 years
.21 .16 -.39 -.03 1
6 Profits/employee (t-1)
standardized to industry
-.13 -.11 .57 .01 -.20 1
7 Total assets (ln) -.06 .06 .04 .04 -.03 .24 1
8 Firm age .02 .004 -.14 -.07 .03 -.09 .12 1
9 Top 50 Recruit ranking -.01 -.01 -.01 -.06 -.01 .10 .32 .06 1
10 Wages  (t-1) standardized to
industry wage
-.01 -.007 .03 -.02 -.07 .20 .24 .02 .11 1
11 Foreign ownership (t-1) -.02 -.006 .13 .04 .002 .19 .32 .00 .09 .11 1
12 Downsizing in population
(previous 3 years)
.13 .05 -.09 .19 .17 .0004 .009 .03 .0001 .00 .09 1
13 Real GDP growth -.01 -.003 .06 .21 .008 .00 -.02 .00 .00 .00 -.03 .14 1
14 Exports/sales (t-1) .01 .05 -.12 -.003 .10 .02 .18 .01 .12 -.01 .18 .02 -.01 1
15 Sum of downsizings for firm x,
1985-t-1
.27 .23 -29 -.07 .15 -.11 .009 -.0001 -.04 .01 .08 .14 .14 .01 1
16 Year .20 .10 -.28 -.17 .28 .00 .03 .00 .00 .00 .12 .51 .14 .03 .18 1
Table 4: Panel probit analyses with robust standard errors, 1990-1997, 1638 firms, downsizings
of 5% or more

























































































































































Pop. downsizing * ln assets .774**
(.264)
Assets * years negative ROA  .060***
(.013)
Pop. downsizing * age .058**
(.025)
Age * years negative ROA -.00002
(.001)




















Pop. downsizing * wage 1.201***
(.353)
Wage * years negative ROA .014
(.019)




















































Industry dummies *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Number of downsizings since




































































Up<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (robust standard errors)
Table 5: Panel probit analyses with robust standard errors, 1990-1997, 1638 firms, downsizings


















































































































































































Age * years negative ROA -.0009
(.001)






























Table 5 (cont’d) : Panel probit analyses with robust standard errors, 1990-1997, 1638 firms,
downsizings of 10% or more




























Industry dummies *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Number of downsizings since




























































Up<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (robust standard errors)
Table 6: Panel probit analyses with robust standard errors, 1990-1997, 1638 firms, downsizings






































































































































































Age * years negative ROA -.0009
(.0008)












































Table 6 (cont’d): Panel probit analyses with robust standard errors, 1990-1997, 1638 firms,





































Industry dummies *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Number of downsizings since




























































Up<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (robust standard errors)















































































population downsizing over 
































0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
population downsizing over




































0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3

































0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
population downsizing over
previous three years
p
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
d
o
w
n
si
zi
n
g
wage=mean-2 sd
wage=mean
wage=mean+2sd
